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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MANDATORY PREGNANcY LEAVE REGULATIONS
AmE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESs-Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
Regulations of the Cleveland, Ohio, Board of Education required
that every pregnant teacher take a maternity leave at the end of her
fourth month of pregnancy. The teacher was* eligible for re-employ-
ment at the beginning of the school semester immediately after her
child attained three months of age, providing she first submitted a
doctor's certificate attesting to her health.
The school board of Chesterfield County, Virginia, enacted a sim-
ilar mandatory leave rule. However, Chesterfield County's re-employ-
ment rule did not condition the teacher's eligibility for re-employment
on the age of her child; it provided that she was eligible for re-em-
ployment after submitting a medical certificate that she was fit to re-
sume her duties.
Pregnant teachers challenged the above regulations on equal pro-
tection grounds in the federal courts; the lower courts were split as to
the validity of the regulations. On certiorari to the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education,'
and the Fourth Circuit in Cohen v. Chesterfield County School
Board,2 the Supreme Court held: The mandatory leave regulations of
both boards and the Cleveland re-employment rule violate the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In both Cohen and LaFleur the school boards attempted to justify
1. 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972). In LaFleur, a divided panel of the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held the Cleveland rules
violative of equal protection. The court held that since male teachers are not subject
to pregnancy, the mandatory leave rule was "inherently based upon a classification
by sex" and "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable in its overbreadth." Id. at 1188.
2. 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973). In Cohen, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, rehearing en banc, upheld the regulations against the equal protection
challenge, thus reversing a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit which had earlier
affirmed a district court holding that the regulations violated equal protection. The
court held that the rule was "not an invidious discrimination based upon sex" be-
cause "[i]t does not apply to women in an area in which they may compete with
men." Id. at 397-98. Further, the court held that the rule reasonably served a per-
missible board objective. Id. at 398-99.
481
Washington Law Review Vol. 50: 481, 1975
their regulations on the grounds that they: (1) maintained continuity
in classroom instruction; and (2) guaranteed the physical capability of
their classroom teachers. 3 Although the Court acknowledged the legit-
imacy of these goals,4 it held as to the first goal that "the arbitrary cut-
off dates embodied in the mandatory leave rules ... have no rational
relationship to the valid state interest of preserving continuity of in-
struction." 5 As for the second goal, the Court found that the means
employed were rationally related to the legitimate state interest in
removing unfit teachers from the classroom. Nevertheless, the Court
held that the leave rules violated due process "because they employ ir-
rebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a female teacher for
deciding to bear a child."'6 Similarly, the three month re-employment
rule of the Cleveland Board was invalidated because it created an irre-
buttable presumption which was unnecessary to achieve the board's
objectives.7
Prior to LaFleur, conclusive presumption analysis8 had been uti-
lized in decisions reached under both the equal protection 9 and due
3. 414 U.S.at 640-41.
4. Id. at 641, 643, 648.
5. Id. at 643. The Court noted that the plaintiffs in LaFleur were required to
leave work during March 1971. when only three months remained in the school year.
Similarly, Mrs. Cohen was compelled to leave work in mid-December 1970. rather
than at the end of the semester in January 1971. These facts support the Court's
conclusion that the regulations did not rationally serve the goal of classroom con-
tinuity.
6. Id. at 648. The Cleveland rule created an "irrebuttable" or "conclusive" pre-
sumption that all women are physically incapable of teaching after their fourth month
of pregnancy. The Court identified this presumption by examining the effects of the
rule (removal of all women four months pregnant) in relation to its asserted purpose
(keeping physically incapable teachers out of the classroom).
7. Id. at 649-50.
8. "Conclusive presumption analysis" is the process by which the Court identifies
the particular conclusive presumptions operating within a statute or regulation. See
note 6 supra. By examining the effect of a statute or regulation in relation to its
asserted purpose, one can determine what the legislature or other rulemaking body
"conclusively presumed" about the affected class. Dissenting justices and commentators
have noted that ever' statute which creates legislative classifications contains "con-
clusive presumptions" according to the above analysis. See, e.g., Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 658 (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting): Vlandis v. Kline.
412 U.S. 441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Bezanson. Some Thoughts on the
Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REv. 644. 653-55 11974):
Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?
72 Micti. L. REV. 800, 830-34(1974).
The effect of a statute on the legislative classes involved is usually obvious from
the statutory language. However, statutory purpose may not be so easy to identify.
See notes 104-05 and accompanying text infra.
9. The first equal protection case in which the Court used conclusive presumption
analysis was Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (invalidating a Texas statute
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process' 0 clauses. Commentators have disagreed as to the nature of
the Court's analysis in due process cases." The thesis of this note is
that Bell v. Burson 2 is the only recent conclusive presumption case
decided under procedural due process; the decisions in Stanley v. Illi-
nois,13 Vlandis v. Kline,' 4 United States Department of Agriculture v.
Murry15 and LaFleur are based on substantive due process analysis.' 6
Declarations in these opinions that the Court was adjudicating statu-
tory and administrative "procedures" should not obscure this fact.
In LaFleur, the Court applied strict scrutiny under substantive due
process because the school board regulations burdened the exercise of
a fundamental right-the right of a woman to decide whether to bear
which imposed a conclusive presumption of nonresidency on all soldiers who moved
to Texas during the course of military duty and thus deprived them of the right to
vote). Conclusive presumption analysis has also been employed in more recent equal
protection cases. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating a
I-year residency requirement for voter registration); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628 (1974) (invalidating a provision of the Social Security Act which denied
illegitimate children benefits if born after the father had become entitled to disability
or death insurance benefits). Jimenez indicates that where a "suspicious," although not
quite "suspect," classification is involved, the Court may use conclusive presumption
analysis to signal the application of a test more stringent than the traditional rational
basis test, yet less strict than the compelling state interest test. See note 21 infra.
10. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Schlesinger
v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926).
11. See Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption
Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REv. 644 (1974) (a merger of the substantive and procedural
aspects of due process analysis); Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions andlor Substantive
Due Process of Law, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 151 (1974) (substantive due process); The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 67-75 (1973) (procedural due
process); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From
Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEo. L. REV. 1173 (1974) (procedural due process); Note,
The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1535,
1548 (1974) (a "strange hybrid" of equal protection and procedural due process);
Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?
72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974) (substantive due process); Note, 58 MINN. L. REv. 965
(1974) (procedural due process).
12. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
13. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
14. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
15. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
16. Had LaFleur been decided under procedural due process, the Court would
have adjudicated the procedures which the school board used to determine whether a
teacher met the statutory and administrative standards governing her right to con-
tinued employment. Since the only fact which the board rule made determinative of
a pregnant teacher's right to continued employment was her degree of pregnancy,
procedural due process would have tested the adequacy of the procedures used to
establish this determinative fact. However the LaFleur Court decided the validity of
the administrative standards themselves. At issue was the school board's choice of
means for achieving its valid goals. Therefore, the case was decided under substantive,
rather than procedural, due process.
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a child. The Court reaffirmed the principle that government is re-
quired to use the least drastic means when statutes and regulations
impinge upon the exercise of a constitutional liberty. Although ques-
tions remain as to the practical operation of the "means" test which
the Court employed, LaFleur provides an analytical framework
within which to evaluate conclusive presumptions which impinge
upon fundamental rights.
LaFleur and the other conclusive presumption cases suggest that
the Court is reviving substantive due process as a basis for engaging in
more active review of the means that legislatures choose to achieve
admittedly valid objectives. Although substantive due process was the
asserted ground for judicial invalidation of much social and economic
legislation during the first third of this century,' 7 since 193718 the
Court has generally abstained from second-guessing the legislative
choice of means and ends under substantive due process. 19 Between
1937 and the recent conclusive presumption cases, the Court applied
due process strict scrutiny to legislative means only when "fundamen-
tal" liberties were infringed.20 In Vlandis and Murry, however, the
Court applied a high level of scrutiny under substantive due process
without identifying any "fundamental" interests which the legislation
infringed. The failure to identify such interests suggests that the Court
is searching for an alternative to the rigid two-tier framework in which
17. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908): Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Strong. The Economic Philosophy of
Lochner: Emergence, Emnbrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 419 (1973).
18. In 1937, the Court sustained minimum wage legislation in West Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S.
525(1923).
19. As the Court stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1 955):
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought.
And, in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726. 730 (1963). the Court stated:
We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.
who are elected to pass laws.
Recent cases suggest that the Court continues to abstain from second-guessing legisla-
tive ends and means under substantive due process. See, e.g., North Dakota State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy): Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (freedom of speech): Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (right of privacy): Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964) (right to travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (freedom of
religion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association).
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it has been deciding the reasonableness of legislative means under
both the equal protection 2' and due process 22 clauses. Although in-
creased flexibility in the Court's review of legislative methods is desir-
able, it should identify the private interests which justify the higher
level of due process scrutiny. Identifying the competing interests is
essential to principled decisionmaking under substantive due process.
Although several commentators23 and at least one Supreme Court
Justice24 have argued that scrutiny of means should be conducted only
21. The degree to which a statutory classification is scrutinized under the equal
protection clause depends on the nature of the classification and the individual interests
affected. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974). Where
economic and social legislation are concerned, statutory and administrative classifications
are presumed constitutional and will generally be upheld unless they bear no rational
relation to any permissible state objective. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). Under this "traditional" standard of equal protection
review, the Court sometimes hypothesizes whether "any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify" the classification. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
426 (1961); see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970).
Strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause is applied where the classification
is based on "suspect" criteria such as race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
or alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), or where the statute
impinges upon "fundamental rights" such as the right to interstate travel, Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), or the right to vote. Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In such a case the state has the
burden of showing that the legislation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
There is evidence that the Court is modifying its "two-tier" approach to equal
protection questions. Recently, an intermediate level of scrutiny appears to have
been applied to classifications based on sex, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and legitimacy. Jimenez v. Wein-
berger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In these cases the Court scrutinized legislative
means more carefully than under the "traditional" equal protection standard to deter-
mine whether the means bore a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation." Reed v. Reed, supra at 76; see Gunther, Tile Supreme Court 1971 Term,
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). This "substantial-relation-in-
fact" standard of equal protection review is the test which Justice Powell applied in his
concurring opinion in LaFleur. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text infra.
22. As under the equal protection clause, the Court has been mechanically
applying strict scrutiny whenever fundamental rights are infringed and minimal
scrutiny in all other cases. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra. However,
the scrutiny applied in Vlandis and Murry appears to be "intermediate"--more
demanding than the minimum rationality test of Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963), yet less rigorous than strict scrutiny. Confusion remains on this point, how-
ever, since the Court failed to state whether the private interests which warranted the
higher level of scrutiny were "fundamental" (indicating strict scrutiny) or merely
"important" (indicating intermediate scrutiny). See notes 55-63 and accompanying
text infra.
23. See, e.g., Bezanson, note 8 supra; Note, Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Pre-
sumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 800 (1974).
24. LaFleur (Powell, J., concurring).
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under the equal protection clause and not under substantive due proc-
ess, their arguments are not convincing. Judicial scrutiny of legislative
means is as appropriate under one clause as under the other. Either
clause may provide the basis for building increased flexibility into ju-
dicial review of legislative methods.
II. PROCEDURAL VS. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION CASES
The fifth and fourteenth amendments provide in part that no
person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." The protection afforded by the due process clauses is
both substantive and procedural. Substantive due process limits legis-
latures and administrative agencies to the pursuit of constitutionally
permissible goals and the employment of means which are reasonably
calculated to attain those goals.25 In Stanley, Vlandis, Murry and
LaFleur, the Court held the legislative choice of means invalid under
substantive due process but did not question the legislative choice of
goals.
Unlike substantive due process, procedural due process does not
question either the legislative choice of goal or its choice of means.
Instead, procedural due process requires governmental bodies to use
fair procedures when enforcing statutes and regulations. At a mini-
mum, procedural due process requires that a deprivation of life, lib-
erty or property be preceded by notice and an opportunity for a
hearing26 on all facts appropriate to the nature of the case. Bell is the
25. See Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
1048, 1049-50 nn.5&8 (1968).
26. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Beyond
notice and an opportunity to be heard, the requirements of procedural due process in
any given situation depend on the nature of the government and private interests at
stake. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). The Court
may hold that a hearing on the facts is constitutionally required before government
deprives, even temporarily, persons of their liberty or property. See, e.g., Bell v.
Burson. 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972): Goldberg v. Kelly.
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Or the
Court may hold that a temporary deprivation is permissible so long as a hearing is
afforded before the deprivation becomes final. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co..
416 U.S. 600 (1974); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry. 339 U.S. 594 (1950):
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett. 277 U.S. 29 (1928):
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). So long as the "statutory procedure effects
a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties." procedural
due process is satisfied. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., supra at 607.
486
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only recent conclusive presumption case in which conclusive presump-
tion analysis was used in a procedural due process context.
A. Conclusive Presumptions of Statutorily Determinative Facts: A
Question of Procedural Due Process
In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,27 the Court declared
that the procedural protection of "property" extends "well beyond ac-
tual ownership of real estate, chattels or money" and includes prop-
erty interests created by statute.28 However, the Court cautioned:29
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it.
The Court cited Goldberg v. Kelly 30 for the proposition that, where
government benefits are concerned, the "statutory and administrative
standards defining eligibility" determine whether a person has a "legit-
imate claim of entitlement."3 ' In other words, the "statutory and
administrative standards" establish which facts are determinative of a
person's right to the government benefit in question.
Bell was decided under procedural due process because the Court
examined the adequacy of the state's procedure for establishing the
fact of fault, which a statute made determinative of a person's right to
the government benefit in question-the right to drive on public roads.
The case involved a Georgia financial responsibility statute32 which
provided for the suspension of an uninsured motorist's driver's license
if the motorist was involved in a traffic accident and could not post
27. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, the Court held that procedural due process
did not apply to a state university's decision not to rehire a nontenured professor
because, in the particular facts of the case, the professor was deprived of neither
"liberty" nor "property" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1973) (professor deemed to have a property interest
in continued employment).
28. 408 U.S. at 571-72, 576-78.
29. Id. at 577.
30. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court held that welfare benefits were
"property" so that the requirements of procedural due process applied to their termi-
nation. Moreover, upon balancing the governmental and private interests at stake,
the Court held that procedural due process required an opportunity to be heard on
the determinative facts before benefits were deprived even temporarily.
31. 408 U.S. at 576, 577.
32. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-605,606, 607, 609, 610, 611, 615.1 (1972).
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security for the amount of damages claimed against him or her. Prior
to suspension, the motorist was afforded an administrative hearing on
the question of "financial responsibility," but no hearing on the ques-
tion of fault.
The State argued that a hearing as to fault was unnecessary since
fault was an irrelevant factor under the statutory scheme. 33 However,
the Court examined the operation of the statute and found that "lia-
bility, in the sense of an ultimate judicial determination of responsibil-
ity, plays a crucial role .... "34 The purpose of Georgia's financial
responsibility statute was the elimination of "the reckless and irre-
sponsible driver of motor vehicles from the highways of the State of
Georgia."35 In addition, a release from liability or an adjudication of
nonliability would prevent or reverse the suspension of one's license.
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court:36
Since the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the
State's determination to deprive an individual of his license, the State
may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that
factor in its prior hearing.
The property interest protected in Bell was the right to drive on
Georgia's highways. The Court examined the statutory scheme to de-
termine what facts were "crucial" to the continued existence of that
right. Procedural due process review was appropriate because the fact
conclusively presumed was indeed crucial. Conceivably, the Georgia
statute could have made actual fault irrelevant by providing for auto-
matic suspension of an uninsured motorist's license after involvement
in one accident. Had the Court held that under such a statute a
hearing as to fault was still required, the decision would have been
one of substantive due process. In effect, the Court would have been
saying that driving is such an important interest that, once a driver's
license is issued, the constitution requires that fault be proven before
that license can be revoked. 37
33. Brief for Respondent at 12, Bell.
34. 402U.S.at541.
35. This statement of purpose was part of an earlier financial responsibility act,
No. 362, § 1, [1956] Ga. Laws 543, 545. The state asserted that this "expressed
statement of purpose has not been changed since [1956], despite a number of
amendments" to the basic act. Brief for Respondent at 9. Bell.
36. 402 U.S. at 541.
37. In Bell, the Court did say that once licenses are issued, "their continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood": therefore, "the
488
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B. Conclusive Presumptions of Statutorily Nondeterminative Facts:
A Question of Substantive Due Process
It seems unlikely that a legislature would intend to make a partic-
ular fact determinative of legal rights or responsibilities under a
statute and at the same time conclusively presume the existence of that
fact with respect to a particular legislative class. Yet, where expressly-
stated conclusive presumptions are involved, courts have occasionally
found such intent,38 and have invalidated the statutes as attempts to
create conclusive rules of evidence with respect to the determinative
facts. 39
However, an express conclusive presumption is usually construed as
a legislative statement of substantive law rather than a conclusive rule
of evidence.40 Commentators have generally agreed with this ap-
licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by
the Fourteenth Amendment." 402 U.S. at 539. The importance of the private interest
at stake persuaded the Court that a hearing on all determinative facts must be con-
ducted before even a temporary deprivation occurs. However, the importance of that
interest was not the reason that fault was declared a determinative fact. Rather, fault
was found to be determinative because the Georgia statute made it so. See notes
34-36 and accompanying text supra.
38. See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,
270 U.S. 230 (1926). In Heiner, the Court invalidated a conclusive presumption of
testamentary intent found in § 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926. § 301(a) of the
Act imposed a tax "upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent." The first
sentence of § 302(c) imposed a tax on transfers made by the decedent in contempla-
tion of death; the second sentence provided that all transfers made within two years
of death "shall be deemed and held to have been made in contemplation of death
within the meaning of this title." The Court construed the Congressional purpose as
intending to tax only testamentary transfers and called the conclusive presumption a
"substitute for proof" of the determinative fact-testamentary intent. 285 U.S. at
323, 329. See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th
Cir. 1953); Perkins v. King Soopers, 122 Colo. 263, 221 P.2d 343 (1950); Mahoney
v. Byers, 4 Terry 608, 48 A.2d 600 (C.A. Md. 1946); Juster Brothers v. Christgau,
214 Minn. 108, 7 N.W.2d 501 (1943); Shellabarger Elevator Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
278 I11. 333, 116 N.E. 170 (1917); Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N.E.
416 (1908); cases cited in 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1355 at 853 n.l (Chadbourn rev.
1972); Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REv. 17. 26 n.29 (1930).
39. In Heiner, the Court held that the conclusive presumption violated fifth
amendment due process because it "constitutes an attempt by legislative fiat, to
enact into existence a fact which here does not, and cannot be made to, exist in
actuality." 285 U.S. at 329.
40. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973);
Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531 (1940); Shanahan v. United States,
447 F.2d 1082 (10th Cir. 1971), Jensen v. United States, 326 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1964); City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 105 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.
1939); Howard Savings Inst. v. Kielb, 38 NJ. 186, 183 A.2d 401 (1962); Street v.
Farmers' Elevator Co., 34 S.D. 523, 149 N.W. 429 (1914).
489
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proach.4 1 Under this analysis, a conclusive presumption is not viola-
tive of procedural due process because the fact conclusively presumed
is deemed not "determinative" of substantive rights under the stat-
ute.42 Also, the presumption ordinarily would survive a substantive due
process challenge because of the Court's application of minimal scru-
tiny to legislative means except where fundamental liberties are in-
fringed.4 3
In Vlandis and Murry, however, the Court's customary deference
to the legislative choice of means disintegrated. In each case the legis-
lature had attempted to make certain facts irrelevant to one's eligi-
bility for particular government benefits. The Court held, under sub-
stantive due process, that the state lacked the power to completely
disregard these facts when distributing the benefits in question.
In Vlandis, a Connecticut statute required "out-of-state" students to
41. See, e.g., Brosman, note 38 supra, at 24-27: Keeton. Statutory Presumptions:
Their Constitutionality and Legal Effect, 10 TEXAS L. REV. 34 (1931): Note. Statu-
tory Criminal Presumptions: A Compulsion to Testify, 5 U.W.L.A.L. REV. 11 n.5
(1973); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 802 (1972). Dean Wigmore
wrote:
In strictness, there cannot be such a thing as a "conclusive presumption."
Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed, in the sense
that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence that the
second fact does not exist, the rule is really providing that, where the first fact is
shown to exist, the second fact's existence is wholly immaterial for the purpose
of the proponent's case: and to provide this is to make a rule of substantive law.
and not a rule apportioning the burden of persuading as to certain propositions
or varying the duty of coming forward with evidence.
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2492 (3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted).
42. For example, in Mourning v. Family Publications Service. Inc., 411 U.S. 356
(1973), the Court upheld the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. §
226.2(k) (1972). The Truth-in-Lending Act requires merchants who regularly extend
credit and impose finance charges to disclose such information as the cash price of
the merchandise sold and the amount of the finance and other charges. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1631-39 (1970). Failure to disclose could subject the merchant to both civil and
criminal penalties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1640 (1970). The Board's Regulation Z
conclusively presumes that all credit payments made in more than four installments
include a finance charge. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1972). The Court held that Regula-
tion Z does not violate due process because it does not conclusively presume the
existence of "determinative facts.'" 411 U.S. at 377. Chief Justice Burger. writing
for the Court, stated that the regulation,
was intended as a prophylactic measure; it does not presume that all creditors
who are within its ambit assess finance charges. but rather, imposes a disclosure
requirement on all members of a defined class in order to discourage evasion by a
substantial portion of that class.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Chief Justice distinguished Heiner v. Donnan. 285 U.S.
312 (1926), and Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926). as cases in which
statutes had been declared invalid "because they conclusively presumed the existence
of determinative facts." 411 U.S. at 377.
43. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
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pay more for tuition at state universities than residents. 44 The statute
conclusively presumed that an "out-of-state" student would retain that
status for the entire period of attendance.45 Justice Stewart, writing
for the Court, declared:46
[S] ince Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allo-
cating the rates for tuition and fees at its university system, it is for-
bidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident
rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of
nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally
true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of
making the crucial determination.
Although the Connecticut legislature was attempting to distinguish
between residents and nonresidents for tuition purposes, the statute
did not make actual residence determinative of a student's right to the
tuition subsidy.47 In fact, the "statutory and administrative standards
defining eligibility" 48 reflected a legislative intent to make actual resi-
dence or nonresidence irrelevant to the operation of the statute. None-
theless, the Court held that, since residence was what the legislature
purported to be concerned with, the state had to distribute its benefits
according to means that more accurately reflected students' actual res-
idence. Thus, the decision was one of substantive, rather than proce-
dural, due process.
The Court also used a substantive due process analysis in Murry,
where Section 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act49 was held unconstitu-
tional. Section 5(b) provided that a household was ineligible for food
stamps if it included a person at least 18 years old who was claimed as
44. An unmarried student was classified as an "out-of-state" student if his or
her "legal address for any part of the one-year period immediately prior to his [or
her] application for admission at a constituent unit of the state system of higher
education was outside of Connecticut." No. 5, § 126(a)(2), [1971] Conn. Acts June
Spec. Sess. 2237, as amended CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329b (Supp. 1974). A
married student was classified as "out-of-state" if the student was living with his or
her spouse and the student's "legal address at the time of his [or her] application
for admission.. was outside of Connecticut." Id. § 126(a)(3).
45. Id. § 126(a)(5).
46. 412 U.S. at 452.
47. Compare the Court's analysis in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), in
which the statute's purported concern with recklessness did make fault determinative
of the motorist's right to drive on Georgia highways. See notes 32-36 and accompany-
ing text supra.
48. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
49. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970).
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a dependent for federal income tax purposes by a person not eligible
for food stamps and not a member of the applicant household. Any
household containing such a "tax dependent" was ineligible for
stamps during the year in which tax dependency was claimed and for
a year thereafter.
Justice Douglas, writing for a plurality, found that the purpose of
Section 5(b) was to curb "abuses" in the food stamp program by
eliminating "nonneedy households."5 0 Therefore, "5(b) creates a con-
clusive presumption that the 'tax dependent's' household is not needy
and has access to nutritional adequacy." 51 The Court held Section
5(b) violative of fifth amendment due process because: 52
[T] he deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is
not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which
the child of the tax-deducting parent lives and rests on an irrebuttable
presumption often contrary to fact.
The Court's analysis in Murry rested on the premise that actual need
was a fact determinative of a household's right to receive food stamps.
However, Congress entertained no such intent. Rather, Congress
intended household income and other financial resources, compliance
with a work registration requirement and compliance with the tax de-
pendency provision to be determinative of household eligibility. 53 Thus,
the Court's holding that due process required Congress to use criteria
more reflective of a household's actual need than the "tax dependent"
50. 413 U.S. at 512-13.
51. Id. at 511.
52. Id. at 514.
53. 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1972). Prescribing income and resource standards as one
criterion for food stamp eligibility indicates a Congressional intent to make eligibility
reasonably relate to a household's monetary need for food assistance. However. com-
pliance with the income and resource standards, the work registration requirement
and the tax dependency provision remained the facts determinative of household
eligibility rather than "actual need," however else that might be defined. Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting, correctly stated that Congress intended § 5(b) to impose a
substantive limitation on a person's right to receive food stamps. Congress did not
intend to create a conclusive rule of evidence with respect to a determinative fact-
"need." 413 U.S. at 524.
Justice Stewart. concurring, construed the statute as entitling "currently needy
households whose members comply with a work requirement" to food stamps. 413
U.S. at 514-15. Thus, he construed § 5(b), not as a substantive limitation on one's
right to receive stamps, but as a procedural device used to determine the crucial
fact-need. This construction of the statute is difficult to support, for it assumes that
Congress intended the work registration, but not the tax dependency. requirement to
be a substantive limitation on a household's entitlement to food stamps: yet both
provisions were enacted at the same time to "curb abuses" in the food stamp program.
492
Vol. 50: 481, 1975
Mandatory Pregnancy Leave
status of one of its members is one of substantive, rather than procedural,
due process.54
In both Vlandis and Murry the Court applied a more rigorous stan-
dard of review to the legislative choice of means than the minimum
rationality test of Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc. 55 and Ferguson v.
Skrupa.56 However, it is not clear whether "strict" or "intermediate"57
scrutiny was applied since the Court identified neither the private in-
terests infringed nor the particulars of the test it was applying. The
Vlandis Court,58 and arguably the Murry Court,59 invalidated the
conclusive presumptions because "reasonable alternative means" ex-
isted for making the relevant factual determinations. "Reasonable al-
ternative means" analysis usually indicates that the Court is applying
strict scrutiny because a fundamental interest is at stake.60 Chief Jus-
tice Burger, dissenting in Vlandis, rightly criticized the majority for
applying a less restrictive alternative test "without explaining why the
statute impairs a genuine constitutional interest truly worthy of the
See United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
Justice Douglas, writing for the plurality, mad6 no attempt to substantively define
the statutory entitlement to food stamps. However, he cited a Department of Agri-
culture regulation providing that participation in the program should be on the basis
of "current circumstances, not past needs." 413 U.S. at 512 n.2.
54. A decision based on procedural due process would have determined the
adequacy of procedures used to establish facts which the Act and regulations made
determinative of household eligibility. Here, in contrast, the Court held that the due
process clause, not a statute or administrative regulation, required that actual need be
considered as one of the facts determinative of household eligibility.
55. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See note 19 supra.
56. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). See note 19 supra.
57. For a discussion of the "intermediate scrutiny" concept as applied in equal
protection and due process contexts, see notes 21 & 22 supra.
58. In Vlandis, the Court appeared to make the availability of "reasonable
alternative means" a ground for its decision. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
The Court cited an opinion by the Connecticut Attorney General, in which
were suggested criteria for determining domiciliary intent, as support for its conclusion:
The State can establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to make
virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the
State, but who have come there solely for educational purposes, cannot take
advantage of the in-state rates.
412 U.S. at 453-54.
59. It is difficult to identify the particulars of the means test applied in Murry.
The plurality opinion did not refer to available alternative means. However, Justice
Stewart, concurring, pointed out that the Food Stamp Act "already provides that
households must demonstrate present neediness to qualify." 413 U.S. at 517 n.2.
Since the Act and attendant federal regulations already contemplated individual
determinations of need, Justice Stewart found that Congress has "alternative means
available to it by which its purpose can be achieved." Id.
60. See cases cited note 20 supra.
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standard of close judicial scrutiny .... "61 A broad reading of Vlandis
and Murry suggests that where government benefits are concerned, all
persons bearing the characteristics about which the legislature "pur-
ports to be concerned" may challenge conclusive presumptions under
a "close judicial scrutiny" analysis. A narrow reading of Vlandis sug-
gests that a higher level of scrutiny was applied because the "perma-
nent irrebuttable presumption" of nonresidence burdened the exercise
of students' fundamental right to interstate travel.6 2 Similarly, a
narrow reading of Murry suggests that a higher level of scrutiny was
applied because the government benefit at stake was critical to the
support of human life.63 However, the Court's failure to suggest these
or other reasons for applying the higher standard of review leaves
uncertainty as to the real meaning of these cases. The Court had a
responsibility to define its standard of review and to articulate its rea-
sons for applying that standard in these cases.
The Court's analysis in Stanley v. Illinois,64 in which the Court in-
validated a conclusive presumption that fathers of illegitimate chil-
dren are unsuitable parents, is superior to that in Vlandis and Murry
61. 412 U.S. at 460.
62. "The right of interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic
constitutional freedom." Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250. 254
(1974). The Court has applied strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause and
invalidated several statutes which placed burdens on the exercise of that right. See, e.g.,
Metnorial Hospital, supra (invalidating a durational residence requirement for the
receipt of free medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating
a durational residence requirement for voting purposes); Shapiro v. Thompson.
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating a durational residence requirement for the receipt
of welfare benefits). In Memorial Hospital, the Court stated that a durational residence
requirement triggers strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause only if it has the
"requisite impact" on interstate travel. 415 U.S. at 256-57. In measuring "requisite
impact,' the Court considers: (1) the actual deterrent effect which the residence
requirement has on migration; and (2) the nature of the penalty which the statute or
regulation imposes. Id. at 257. The second factor is given the most weight. Id. at
257-58. The Court's failure to apply strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause
to the conclusive presumption in Vlandis reflects the Court's judgment that a higher
tuition fee is not as severe a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel as is
withholding either "a basic necessity of life," see Memorial Hospital, supra, or the right
to vote, see Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. Nevertheless, the right to interstate travel was
penalized to some degree by the conclusive presumption in Vlandis. Conceivably.
this is the reason the Court applied a higher standard of scrutiny than the minimum
rationality test under substantive due process.
63. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County. 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974).
wherein the Court stated:
[G]overnmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have often
been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance than less essential
forms of governmental entitlements.
64. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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because the Court at least provided reasons for applying strict scrutiny
under substantive due process. In Stanley, the Court invalidated a sta-
tutory scheme6 5 whereby an illegitimate child could be removed from
the custody of its putative father without providing a hearing on his
fitness as a parent. Parents of legitimate children and mothers of illegi-
timate children were given a hearing. The Court held that "the Due
Process Clause" required that putative fathers be afforded a hearing as
well. 66 Although the Court stressed that it was deciding the validity of
Illinois "procedures" and cited Bell as authority for its decision,67 the
Court did not adjudicate pure "procedure" in the sense of Bell.
Whereas in Bell the Court found the Georgia legislature intended ac-
tual fault to determine the motorist's right to keep his license, 68 the
Illinois scheme in Stanley blatantly made fitness irrelevant to the puta-
tive father's right to retain custody of his children. 69 Yet the Court
held that parental unfitness was appropriate to the nature of the case
for constitutional reasons. Because (1) the "integrity of the family unit
has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, '70 (2) the "rights to conceive and to raise one's children
have been deemed 'essential,' "171 and (3) the "custody, care and nur-
ture of the child reside first in the parents,172 the Court concluded that
Stanley's interest in retaining custody of his children was "cognizable
and substantial."7 3 By thus explicitly identifying its reasons for strict
scrutiny, the Stanley Court provided an example followed in LaFleur,
whose analysis is consequently superior to the Court's obfuscation in
65. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1972), as amended,
(Supp. 1974).
66. The Court also held that the statute violated equal protection. 405 U.S. at 658.
67. 405 U.S. at 656-57.
68. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
69. 405 U.S. at 650. Before a child could be removed from "parents," the statute
required that they be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of
their fitness, including such procedural safeguards as the right to present evidence,
to cross-examine witnesses, to be represented by counsel and, if indigent, to have
counsel appointed by the court. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20(1) (Smith-Hurd
1972). However, the statute provided:
"Parents" means the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of
them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive
parent. It does not include a parent whose rights in respect of the minor have
been terminated in any manner provided by law.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (Smith-Hurd 1972), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
70. 405 U.S. at 651.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 651, quoting Prince v. Massachussets, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
73. Id. at 652.
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Vlandis and Murry; the LaFleur Court explained that strict scrutiny
was applied because the conclusive presumption of unfitness burdened
the exercise of a fundamental right.74
III. DUE PROCESS SCRUTINY OF LEGISLATIVE MEANS
UNDER LAFLEUR
LaFleur was decided under substantive, rather than procedural,
due process. 75 The question decided was not whether the school board
could remove unfit teachers from the classroom; the Court acknowl-
edged this to be a legitimate board objective.76 Rather, the question
was whether a school board that purported to be concerned with
physical fitness could conclusively presume unfitness in all women
after their fourth month of pregnancy. The Court applied strict scru-
tiny to the board's choice of means because the regulations burdened
the female teacher's exercise of her fundamental right to decide
whether to bear a child. 77 The Court found due process violated be-
cause: (1) the conclusive presumption was neither "necessarily [nor]
universally true";78 and (2) the board had "reasonable alternative
74. See note 77 and accompanying text infra.
75. See note 16 supra. LaFleur did not involve a deprivation of "property," as
defined in Roth. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra. Although the school
board purported to be concerned with physical capability, actual competence was not
meant to be determinative of the teacher's right to continued employment. In short.
pregnant women were not "entitled" to retain government employment even though
physically competent.
Nor did LaFleur involve a deprivation of "liberty" for purposes of procedural due
process since discharge due to pregnancy does not have implications that would
seriously damage a teacher's standing in the community or impair her ability to
obtain further employment. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74; Shirck v. Thomas, 486
F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973); Schultz v. School District of Dorchester, 367 F.Supp. 467
(D. Neb. 1973); Whatley v. Price, 368 F.Supp. 336 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
76. 414 U.S. at 641,643,648.
77. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating on equal
protection grounds a Massachusetts statute which forbade the distribution of con-
traceptives to all but married persons), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
(1973) (invalidating on due process grounds a Texas criminal abortion statute),
the Court grounded this fundamental right in the constitutional right of privacy
which, in turn, is implicit in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Roe, the Court acknowledged that " [t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention
any right of privacy," and therefore cautioned that "only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy." Id. at 152. In LaFleur, the Court declared simply that "freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 414 U.S. at 639-40.
78. 414 U.S. at 646, quoting Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 452.
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methods" available for making the factual determination.79
In determining that the conclusive presumption of unfitness was
neither "necessarily [nor] universally true," the Court considered
"legislative facts"8 0 regarding the nondisabling effects of pregnancy. De-
spite a "plethora of conflicting medical testimony,"18 the medical ex-
perts did agree that "the ability of any particular pregnant woman to
continue at work past any fixed time in her pregnancy is very much an
individual matter."82 The Court concluded:8 3
Even assuming, arguendo, that there are some women who would be
physically unable to work past the particular cutoff dates embodied
in the challenged rules, it is evident that there are large numbers of
teachers who are fully capable of continuing work for longer than the
... regulations will allow.
Also central to the decision in LaFleur was the Court's conclusion
that procedure-by-conclusive-presumption was unnecessary to achieve
the board's objectives since "reasonable alternative methods"84 were
79. See 414 U.S. at 647 & n.14. The terms "means" and "methods" are used
interchangeably by the Court.
80. Legislative facts are also regularly considered when determining the constitu-
tionality of rebuttable presumptions. In the criminal law, a rebuttable presumption
violates due process "unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is
made to depend." Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969). In determining the
probable validity of a rebuttable presumption, the Court considers reports of legisla-
tive committees, the testimony of expert witnesses, reports by public and private
agencies, summaries of social science research, books, periodicals and all "available,
pertinent data." Id. at 38.
For a discussion of the Court's consideration of legislative facts, see Karst, Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75 (1960) and K. DAvis,
ADMNIsTRATIvE LAW TExT § 7.03 (3d ed. 1972).
81. 414U.S. at 643.
82. Id. at 645.
83. Id. at 645-46.
84. "Reasonable alternative means" analysis has been applied to government
regulation infringing upon such fundamental liberties as the right to travel, Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the exercise of religion, Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963), and freedom of association. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479(1960). The "reasonable alternative" principle was succinctly stated in Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted):
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the
same basic purpose.
"Reasonable alternative means" analysis has also been used to determine the
validity of state regulation which discriminates against interstate commerce, Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), and to determine the validity
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available for making the factual determinations. 85 For example, phys-
ical examinations of teachers, relied on by the board to determine a
teacher's fitness to return to work after giving birth, could be used
to determine fitness prior to birth.8 6 Thus, the Court concluded
that the regulations could not "pass muster under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they employ irrebut-
table presumptions that unduly penalize a female teacher for deciding
to bear a child. 87 The penalty was "undue" because procedure by
conclusive presumption was not necessary to achieve the board's
objective.
LaFleur leaves unanswered, however, several questions about the
reasonable alternative means test. First, how "available" must an al-
ternative be before the Court will use it to strike a conclusive pre-
sumption? Must the challenged agency already be using the alternative
means to determine the same or a similar fact in a slightly different
context? 88 Or is an alternative "available" if other agencies with sim-
ilar problems have developed such alternatives, even though the chal-
lenged agency may not have done so?89
In addition, it is unclear what quantum of proof is required con-
cerning the effectiveness of available alternatives before the conclusive
presumption under challenge will be invalidated. Professor Ratner
suggests that "deference is due the legislative choice unless the alterna-
tive clearly is less restrictive and within the same range of effectiveness
and cost." 90 On the other hand, Professors Wormuth and Mirkin
of state regulation of economic activities. See Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105.
(1928); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927): Weaver v. Palmer Bros.
Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926): Adams v. Tanner. 244 U.S. 590 (1917). But see Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). See also Ratner, The Function of the Due Process
Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1082-93 (1968), Struve. The Less-Restrictive
Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967):
Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254
(1964).
85. 414 U.S. at 647 n. 14, 649-50.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 648.
88. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441. 453-54 (1973): United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 517 n.2 (1973) (Stewart. J.. concurring): notes
58 & 59 supra.
89. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), in which Justice Marshall.
dissenting, refuted the government's assertion that maintaining its present procedure
was necessary for reasons of "efficiency" by citing alternative procedures that had
been employed successfully by other government agencies. Id. at 224-25.
90. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048.
1089 (1968) (emphasis in original).
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point out that, in fact, the nature of the private interests affected has
determined the intensity of the Court's scrutiny of alternatives.91 Cer-
tainly, the cost or convenience of an available alternative should not
be the prime consideration.9 2
Both LaFleur93 and Vlandis94 indicate that the effectiveness of
available alternatives is a crucial element in the Court's substantive
due process analysis. In LaFleur, the Court noted that a teacher's
physical condition might be so unpredictable during the last few
weeks of pregnancy that no reasonable alternative to a conclusive
presumption of unfitness exists during that period.95 The Court invited
the presentation of additional legislative facts on this question and
suggested that a more narrowly-drawn conclusive presumption might
be upheld if necessary to achieve the board's goals.96
The Court's analysis in Vlandis also suggests that procedure-by-
conclusive-presumption would be upheld if no reasonably effective
alternative existed. The Vlandis Court concluded that Connecticut
was able to establish "reasonable criteria" for determining domiciliary
intent.9 7 The Court stated, however, that "as one element in demon-
strating bona fide residence," a less permanent, but nevertheless con-
clusive, presumption of nonresidence was permissible.9 8
91. In cases dealing with state interference with interstate commerce and
constitutional guarantees of procedural rights, the Court has actually canvassed
the alternatives; and when it has found them wanting it has sustained the broader
statute. But in the area of first amendment rights, when it has applied the doctrine
of the reasonable alternative, the Court has required the use of a statute narrowly
drawn to the dimensions of the permissible legislative goal, whether or not this
is as satisfactory as a broader law.
Wormuth & Mirkin, note 84 supra, at 287. Studies of administrative procedures
conducted by independent commissions and by the executive branch might provide
useful data on the effectiveness of available alternatives. See Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 224-25 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. As the Court stated in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972):
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication.
But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.
Similarly, in LaFleur the Court noted that "administrative convenience alone is
insufficient to make valid what otherwise is a violation of due process of law." 414
U.S. at 647.
93. 414 U.S. at 647 n.14.
94. 412 U.S. at 453-54.
95. 414 U.S. at 647 n.13.
96. Id.
97. 412 U.S. at 453-54.
98. Id. at 452. The Court also expressly reaffirmed the vitality of Starns v.
Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
412 U.S. 452-53 n.9. In Starns, the district court held that a regulation of the Uni-
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Thus, the Court's discussion of the effectiveness of available alter-
natives in both Vlandis and LaFleur suggests that conclusive pre-
sumptions which are "necessary" to achieve legitimate state objectives
will be upheld. Such a result would be consistent with the Court's
treatment of the Texas criminal abortion statute in Roe v. Wade,99 in
which the Court declared that the state's interests in protecting both
the health of the pregnant woman and the potentiality of human life
were "important and legitimate."' 00 "Each grows in substantiality as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each
becomes 'compelling.' "101 The state is permitted to interfere with the
pregnant woman's decisions concerning the birth of her child only
when its interests have become "compelling." 102 Under the Roe analy-
sis, the Court might reason that the state's legitimate interest in main-
taining the physical competence of its classroom teachers grows "as
the woman approaches term." It would probably find that the state's
interest becomes "compelling" in the last weeks of pregnancy, thereby
justifying a conclusive presumption of unfitness for that period.' 0 3
Thus, LaFleur does not leave school boards powerless to regulate as
to teacher fitness.
Finally, when considering alternatives to a particular procedure-by-
conclusive-presumption, courts should remember that a statute may
versity of Minnesota, which provided that no student was eligible for "resident
classification" for tuition purposes "unless he [had] been a bona fide domiciliary of
the state for at least a year immediately prior thereto." did not deny equal protec-
tion. 326 F. Supp. at 235-36. The district court found it,
reasonable to presume that a person who has not resided within the state for a
year is a nonresident student, and that it is reasonable to require that to rebut this
presumption the student must be a bona fide domiciliary of the state for one year.
Id. at 240.
99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. Id. at 162.
101. Id. at 162-63.
102. The Court held that the state's interest in protecting the health of the woman
becomes compelling "at approximately the end of the first trimester." 410 U.S. at 163.
From this point, "a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the
regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."
Id. The "compelling point" with respect to the State's interest in protecting fetal life
is "viability," i.e., when the fetus is capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's
womb." Id. After viability, the state "may go so far as to proscribe abortion during
that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."
Id. at 163-64.
103. See notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra.
500
Vol. 50: 481, 1975
Mandatory Pregnancy Leave
serve more than one purpose. 04 An alternative procedure effective in
achieving one legitimate state purpose may not be efffective in
achieving others. An examination of the cases in which the reasonable
alternative means test has been applied to economic regulation,
prompted Professor Struve to comment, "Striking down a govern-
mental regulation without considering all of its purposes is one of the
most frequent examples of judicial misuse of the less-restrictive-alter-
native principle.' 10 5
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AFTER LAFLEUR:
AN EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
Equal protection scrutiny' 06 determines the validity of legislative
means by focusing on the classifications chosen to effect legislative
goals. Thus, equal protection review determines the same issue as
means scrutiny under substantive due process. 107 Under both equal
protection and substantive due process,108
the decisive question is always whether the class of claimants or claims
affected by legislative (or administrative) action has features which
can be said to justify, at some level of stringency ... the special treat-
ment accorded to them by the impugned law.
104. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82
YALE LJ. 123 (1972). Indeed, in LaFleur the school board suggested several purposes
for the maternity leave regulations: (1) to protect the health of the teacher and her
unborn child; (2) to assure that students have a physically capable instructor in the
classroom at all times; and (3) to maintain continuity of classroom instruction, since
advance knowledge of when a pregnant teacher must leave facilitates hiring a
qualified substitute. See 414 U.S. at 640-41.
105. Struve, note 84 supra, at 1469. In determining what goals the legislature
sought to achieve, the Court should consider,
both the language of the statute and general public knowledge about the evil
which the legislature sought to remedy; prior law; accompanying legislation;
enacted statements of purpose; formal public pronouncements; and internal legis-
lative history.
Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83 HARv. L. REv.
1887 n.1 (1970). On statutory construction generally, see MacCallum, Legislative
Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205 (1970).
106. See note 21 supra.
107. See Gunther, note 21 supra, at 42 (" [T]he formulation requiring that the
means bear a 'substantial relation' to the legislative ends stems not from an equal
protection decision, but from Nebbia v. New York [291 U.S. 502 (1934)], the first
economic due process case of the modern hands off era."); Karst, Invidious Discrimin-
ation: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula,"
16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969).
108. Stone, Introduction: Due Progress of "Due Process," 25 HAST. LJ. 785,
797 (1974).
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Justice Powell109 and several commentators11 ° have argued that La-
Fleur should have been decided under the equal protection clause
rather than under substantive due process. However, the reasons ad-
vanced are not convincing.
Justice Powell, concurring, would have decided LaFleur on equal
protection grounds. He analyzed several aspects of the board's interest
in "fostering continuity in teaching" and found "the linkage between
the board's legitimate ends and their chosen means too attenuated" to
support the regulations. 11 Purporting to apply "rational basis stan-
dards of equal protection review," he pronounced the classifications
"irrationally overinclusive." 112
Justice Powell is emerging as the Court's foremost proponent of the
"substantial-relation-in-fact" test under the equal protection clause.113
Under this test, the equal protection clause imposes a constitutional
requirement that legislative means "substantially further" legislative
goals. Powell's concurring opinion in LaFleur establishes his clear
preference for constitutional adjudication of legislative means under
equal protection rather than under substantive due process analysis.
However, the reasons for this preference are not entirely clear. Powell
declared it "difficult to see the terminus of the road upon which
the Court has embarked under the banner of 'irrebuttable presump-
tions.' "114 Yet, one might say the same with respect to his "newer"
standard of equal protection; no principled standards have been
articulated for determining whether a legislative classification is
"substantially related in fact" to the goals of the legislation. Nor has
there been any articulation by Justice Powell as to the kinds of classi-
fications that will warrant scrutiny under this test as opposed to the
traditional rational basis test.
There is no convincing reason for preferring "means" scrutiny
under the equal protection clause to such scrutiny under substantive
due process analysis. Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express
109. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text infra.
110. See, e.g., Bezanson, note 8 supra; Note. The Irrebuttable Presumption Doc-
trine in the Supreme Court, note I I supra; Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doc-
trine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, note 11 supra.
Ill. 414U.S.at655.
112. Id. at 653.
113. See, e.g., Justice Powell's analysis in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 406
U.S. 164 (1972).
114. 414 U.S. at 652.
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Agency v. New York, 115 expressed a preference for adjudication
under the equal protection clause because "[i] nvalidation of a statute
or an ordinance on due process grounds leaves ungoverned and un-
governable conduct which many people find objectionable." Justice
Jackson was referring, however, to the substantive due process of the
Lochner era, which did indeed declare legislative ends, as well as
means, invalid. In contrast, LaFleur acknowledged the legitimacy of
the school board's goals and left the board free to achieve them by
enacting more narrowly-drawn regulations. The due process holding
left the school boards in the same position as if the rules had been
invalidated on equal protection grounds. Under both equal protection
and substantive due process, the legislation is remanded to the law-
makers for more precise drafting. The Court's sometimes vehement
rejection of "notions of substantive due process" 116 has been an over-
reaction because "[i] n reality, the primary evil of the discredited doc-
trine was the dogmatic judicial intervention regarding ends, not
means."' "17 Judicial deference to legislative means is not as critical as
deference to legislative goals. 11
Some commentators have expressed concern that renewed constitu-
tional adjudication under substantive due process rather than equal
protection analysis is apt to be "unprincipled" and "result-oriented." 1 9
115. 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949).
116. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 463 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
note 19 and accompanying text supra.
117. Gunther, note 21 supra, at 42.
118. Professor Ratner argues:
The legislative choice of method need not be accorded the deference due the
legislative choice of goal, because conduct-regulating policy is not nullified byjudicial rejection of method. The Court is engaged not in negating legislative
purpose but in assisting the legislature to achieve its policy within the constitutional
framework.
Ratner, note 25 supra, at 1078. Professor Gunther asserts:
Means scrutiny ... can improve the quality of the political process-without
second-guessing the substantive validity of its results-by encouraging a fuller
airing in the political arena of the grounds for legislation. Examination of means
in light of asserted state purposes would directly promote public consideration of
the benefits assertedly sought by the proposed legislation; indirectly, it would
stimulate fuller political examination, in relation to those benefits, of the costs
that would be incurred if the proposed means were adopted.
Gunther, note 21 supra, at 44.
119. See, e.g., Vieria, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and the Right of
Abortion, 25 HAST. L.J. 867, 872 (1974):
The root problem with substantive due process was the absence of adequate
standards for determining which of the values not explicitly safeguarded by the
constitutional text are nevertheless entitled to special protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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However, other commentators point out that the vagaries of the equal
protection clause contain as much potential for "unprincipled" de-
cisionmaking as does substantive due process. 120 Under either analysis,
the chief danger is that the Court will fail to identify the private
interests which warrant special constitutional protection. Due process
scrutiny of legislative means, whether that scrutiny be "strict" or
"intermediate," is justified so long as the competing interests are
clearly identified.
Daniel Clinton Sever
120. See, e.g., Stone, note 108 supra, at 797.
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